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at law

The FDA, Preemption, and
Public Safety
by Lawrence O. Gostin

M

ost people think of preemption as a technical, constitutional doctrine, but it is
pivotally important to health and safety
and opens the door to broad judicial
discretion. The Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts’ jurisprudence, with its support
for both business and preemption, has
been distinctly antiregulatory, invalidating major state public health rules
in occupational safety, tobacco control,
and motor vehicle safety, among other
things.1 And apart from these antiregulatory stances, the Supreme Court has
also been maddeningly inconsistent.
Consider three relatively recent cases.
In its 2008 decision in Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., the Court held that
federal law bars injured consumers from
challenging the safety or effectiveness of
medical devices approved by the Food
and Drug Administration.2 A year later,
however, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court
came to the opposite conclusion, ruling that injured consumers could sue
pharmaceutical companies for failing
to warn about the risks of taking brandname drugs.3 Yet on June 23, 2011,
in PLIVA, Inc., v. Mensing, the Court
found that injured consumers could
not bring failure-to-warn claims for injuries caused by FDA-approved generic
pharmaceuticals.4 Thus, in less than
four years, the Court barred state health
and safety litigation for FDA-approved
medical devices, allowed failure-to-warn
claims for branded pharmaceuticals,
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and then barred those same claims for
generic pharmaceuticals.5
What is the rational basis for treating brand-name and generic medicines
differently when, by law, the products
must be equivalent? Or for treating
brand-name drugs and medical devices
differently even though they go through
similar approval processes? As Justice
Sotomayor (dissenting in PLIVA) put
it, this “leads to so many absurd consequences that I cannot fathom that Congress would have intended to preempt
state law,” while even Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court, admitted this
outcome “makes little sense.”
In order to figure out how we
reached this predicament, let’s take a
step back and find out more about the
perversion of the preemption doctrine,
the newest ruling on generic medicines,
and the public health value of consumer
litigation.
Public Health and Preemption

P

reemption is a doctrine undergirded by the supremacy clause, which
holds that federal law prevails over state
law if there is a conflict. The two cornerstones of preemption are Congress’s
intent as the “ultimate touchstone” and
the strong presumption against preemption when the state exercises its historic
police powers.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly perverted these two key criteria.

Congress intended for federal and state
food and drug regulation to work side
by side, each providing a significant yet
distinct layer of consumer protection. If
Congress thought state lawsuits posed
an obstacle to its objectives, it surely
would have said so explicitly at some
point during the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s seventy-year history. How
could Congress have intended such irrational inconsistencies between brandname and generic drugs?
Is it reasonable for the nation’s highest court to conclude that Congress actually intended to bar injured patients
from judicial recourse against companies that, knowing the risks, aggressively market hazardous drugs or medical
devices? The public might express even
greater skepticism if tort immunity were
granted to corporations that defraud
the agency. But that is precisely the
position of the Supreme Court, which
permits a corporation to use FDA approval as a shield against litigation even
if it deceived the agency into granting
that approval. In Buckman Company v.
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, the Court
held that state law fraud-on-the-FDA
claims were preempted.6 The Court
split four against four when asked if
consumer litigation was also preempted
when drug companies defraud the agency.7 Since Chief Justice Roberts did not
participate in the decision, the Court
would likely side with the pharmaceutical industry, even if it intentionally
hides safety data.
Consumer safety regulation, moreover, is a classic state police power. State
public health regulation has a long history and remains a robust activity today. The common law has traditionally
granted causes of action for consumer
products that are defective or for which
companies fail to adequately disclose
known risks. And although the Court
admonishes against preemption of state
safety rules, it did not even mention this
doctrine in Riegel, PLIVA, or Buckman.
The Irrational Consequences of
PLIVA

I

n the aftermath of PLIVA, an injured
consumer’s access to the civil justice
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system turns solely on “the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled
her prescription with a brand-name
drug or a generic.”8 Yet 78 percent of
all prescription drugs dispensed are generics, and with patents expiring this
year on blockbuster drugs like Lipitor,
Plavix, and Zyprexa, the generic market
share will rise further.9 This is happening by design—the express purpose of
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is
to make generic drugs affordable and
available. State law, moreover, authorizes pharmacists to substitute generic
for brand-name drugs when filling prescriptions. Currently, the prescriptions
for more than 90 percent of drugs for
which a generic version exists are filled
with generics. Consequently, most consumers harmed by medications now
lack access to justice.
Generic manufacturers—often large,
multinational companies—now have
little incentive to monitor and disclose
safety risks. Brand-name manufacturers
also may leave the market once the generic version is available, so no one will
have the incentive to strengthen warning labels or to remove dangerous products from the market.
The Value of Consumer Safety
Litigation

W

hy do we need litigation when the
FDA already has a duty to protect the public’s safety? Lawsuits bring
advantages for the agency as well as for
consumers because gaping resource and
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informational deficits hamper its oversight. The FDA’s responsibilities are vast
and cover 25 percent of all consumer
spending, including food, drugs, vaccines, and medical devices. Yet it lacks
adequate staffing and resources, even as
its mandate and public safety concerns
continue to increase, and it does not
have the information it needs for effective oversight. Consequently, it is forced
to rely on manufacturers to find and
disclose hazards.
Further hampering the FDA’s oversight is the fact that its approval decisions consider relatively small numbers
in clinical trials, so that any given drug’s
full safety and effectiveness profile
emerges only after it is marketed to a
large population. Tort litigants, unlike
the FDA, have subpoena power, and
discovery can be a potent way to inform
the agency and public of undisclosed
risks. Litigation can also be socially and
politically mobilizing: uncovering poor
industry practices can drive regulatory
reform.
These resource and informational
deficits have resulted in high-profile
regulatory failures involving the FDAapproved COX-2 selective nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs Vioxx and Celebrex, the type 2 diabetes drug Avandia,
and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. In 2009, the FDA issued a “black
box warning” about the very drug at
issue in PLIVA—metoclopramide, also
known as Reglan. Litigation revealed
that manufacturers knew the risks but
did not promptly inform the FDA.

State tort law provides a system of civil
justice designed to compensate patients,
deter unreasonably hazardous conduct,
and encourage innovation in product
design, packaging, labeling, and advertising. Tort law, therefore, closes
regulatory gaps in the FDA’s premarket
approval process, providing much-needed postmarketing surveillance.
In the end, the public is caught in a
catch-22. While the FDA is perceived
as ineffectual and the hazards of widelyused drugs and devices continue to be
revealed, the Supreme Court makes it
harder for patients to discover wrongdoing—even fraud—and to be fairly compensated for their avoidable injuries.
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